

Message Text

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ORIGIN EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-10 ARA-06 AF-06 NEA-10 EUR-12 /054 R

66616

DRAFTED BY EA/FMISCH:CHG

APPROVED BY EA-MR. EDMOND

IO/UNP-MR KRIEBEL

ARA/LA-HRYAN

AF:EFFUGIT

ARA/EP-MR WEBER

NEA-AEGRIFFIN

EUR:EDCASEY

----- 037297

R 301757Z AUG 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 207467

FOLLOWING REPEAT LIMA 7062 ACTION SECSTATE INFO USUN NEW YORK

COLOMBO SEOUL DATED 28 AUG 75

1. THE TELEGRAM FROM LIMA REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION BELOW
IS COMMENDED FOR THE CANDID VIEW IT PROVIDES OF THE WORKINGS
OF THE QUOTE CONSENSUS UNQUOTE FORUM AND DYNAMICS OF THE
NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 7062

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: UNGA, KS, CN

SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE: HOW THE NAC DECIDED ON THE
KOREAN MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS

REF: STATE 204543

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF HOW THE LIMA NAC ACCEPTED
THE NORTH KOREAN BID FOR MEMBERSHIP AND REJECTED THAT OF
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SOUTH KOREA. THE REPORT IS REVEALING AS TO THE DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS, ATMOSPHERE, AND DYNAMICS OF THE NAC, PARTICULARLY
ON A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE.

2. IN PLENARY SESSION THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 25-26, THE LIMA NAC DECIDED BY CONSENSUS TO ACCEPT THE NORTH KOREAN APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP, BUT THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS FOR ADMITTANCE OF THE ROK. SUPPORTERS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN POSITION FELL INTO THREE GROUPS. THE FIRST GROUP BELIEVED THAT CRITERIA SHOULD BE DEVELOPED BY A SUB-COMMITTEE TO GOVERN THE ADMITTANCE OF MEMBERS. THESE COUNTRIES BELIEVED THAT DECISIONS SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL THE COLOMBO SUMMIT CONFERENCE. LIBERIA, MALAYSIA, AFGHANISTAN, SINGAPORE AND PERU FAVORED THIS APPROACH.

3. A SECOND GROUP OF COUNTRIES FAVORED THE ADMISSION OF BOTH NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA AT LIMA. THESE WERE SIERRA LEON, IVORY COAST, CAMEROON, GAMBIA, LESOTHO, OMAN, MOROCCO, CHAD THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, SAUDI ARABIA AND GABON. THE LAST TWO COUNTRIES SPOKE STRONGLY FOR THIS SOLUTION TO THE KOREAN APPLICATIONS ISSUE.

4. AS A VARIANT OF THE SECOND POSITION, IVORY COAST, CAMEROON AND GABON MAINTAINED THAT IF BOTH KOREAS WERE NOT ADMITTED, NEITHER SHOULD BE UNTIL COLOMBO, BUT THEY DID NOT FAVOR A SUB-COMMITTEE TO SET CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP.

5. THE MOST DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE NAC DECISION WAS THE SPEECH BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FONMIN, MADAME BINH. SHE MADE AN IMPASSIONED ADDRESS ATTACKING IMPERIALISM AND ITS SOUTH KOREAN LACKEY, WHICH HARBORS 40,000 U.S. TROOPS ON ITS SOIL. SHE FURTHER ATTACKED SOUTH KOREA FOR SENDING 60,000 TROOPS TO VIETNAM AS AGENT OF SUPPRESSION WHO HAD COMMITTED ATROCITIES. SHE THREATENED THAT SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD WALK OUT OF THE CONFERENCE IF SOUTH KOREA WERE ADMITTED. (NOTE: SOUTH VIETNAM AUTOMATICALLY BECAME A MEMBER OF THE NONE-ALIGNED GROUP WHEN THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (ALREADY IN THE NAC) BECAME THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY.) CUBA, CONGO AND CAMBODIA STRONGLY SECONDED THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REMARKS.

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6. THE SECOND MAJOR FACTOR IN THE NAC DECISION WAS THAT THE PHILIPPINES APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP HAD BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER THE NIGHT OF THE 25TH. A NUMBER OF ASIAN NEUTRALS INCLUDING INDONESIA, NEPAL AND SINGAPORE SAW HOW STRONGLY THE NAC OPPOSED THAT MEMBERSHIP AND WERE DISSUADED FROM SPEAKING OUT TOO STRONGLY FOR ANOTHER ASIAN COUNTRY WITH U.S. TROOPS ON ITS SOIL: SOUTH KOREA.

7. THE THIRD MAJOR FACTOR WAS THE LOUD, ALMOST CONTINUOUS APPLAUSE AND OTHER NOISE BY THE SUPPORTERS OF NORTH KOREA. THIS SIMPLY INTIMIDATED THOSE WHO OPPOSED THEM.

8. SAUDI ARABIA, GABON AND LESOTHO ALL SPOKE IN FAVOR

OF THE SOUTH KOREAN POSITION. IN RESPONSE TO THE ASSERTION THAT THE HAVANA COORDINATING BUREAU MEETING HAD IN EFFECT ALREADY DECIDED IN FAVOR OF NORTH KOREA, SAUDIA ARABIA COUNTERED THAT HAVANA DID NOT REPRESENT THE WILL OF ALL. THE SAUDI ALSO POINTED TO NORTH KOREAN PACTS WITH CHINA AND THE USSR, AND ARGUED THAT BOTH KOREAS SHOULD BE ADMITTED.

9. GABON MADE THE POINTS THAT IT ENJOYS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BOTH KOREAS, AND THAT THERE ARE "INVISIBLE FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES" IN NORTH KOREA, SO IT IS NO DIFFERENT FROM SOUTH KOREA.

10. LESOTHO ARGUED THAT THE HAVANA BUREAU MEETING COULD NOT DECIDE FOR ALL. IT BELIEVED THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOREIGN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH KOREA. IN ORDER TO HAVE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE KOREAS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT, BOTH SHOULD BE ADMITTED.

11. SUPPORTERS OF NORTH KOREA SAID THAT CRITERIA FOR NAC MEMBERSHIP ALREADY EXISTED, AND THE HAVANA BUREAU MEETING HAD APPLIED THEM. ALGERIA, CUBA, SOUTH VIETNAM, GHANA AND SENEGAL PRESSED THE CHAIRMAN (PERUVIAN FONMIN DE LA FLOR) FOR A QUICK DECISION. DE LA FLOR SUCCESSFULLY HELD OUT THAT THERE SHOULD BE MORE DISCUSSION AND THAT EVERY SOVEREIGN COUNTRY HAD A RIGHT TO EXPRESS ITS OPINION. ONCE ALL SEEMED TO HAVE SPOKEN DE LA FLOR ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE ADMITTANCE OF NORTH KOREA. NO ONE SPOKE, AND THE CHAIRMAN THUS FOUND A CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF THAT APPLICATION. DE LA FLOR'S QUESTION
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WHETHER THERE WERE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE ADMITTANCE OF SOUTH KOREA BROUGHT FORTH A CHORUS OF "NO,NO,NO", AND THE CHAIRMAN FOUND NO CONSENSUS.

12. EMBOFF HAS SPOKEN WITH SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR MOON, WHO SUPPLIED MUCH OF THE FOREGOING INFORMATION. MOON IS HIGHLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE NAC DECISION, BUT HE ALSO POINTS OUT THAT THE NAC DEBATE ON KOREA REVEALED THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS MANY FRIENDS, EVEN IN THE NAC. COMMENT: THIS IS TRUE, BUT THE TROUBLE IS THAT SOUTH KOREA'S FRIENDS WERE NOT NUMEROUS OR VOCAL ENOUGH.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NONALIGNED NATIONS MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS, MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS, MEMBER ADMISSIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE207467
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA/FMISCH:CHG
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750301-0763
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750898/baaaaafs.tel
Line Count: 157
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 JUL 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <19 NOV 2003 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, KS, KN, LIMA
To: ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006